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This paper studies the transmission of monetary policy in terms
of the interest rate pass-through in the case of Chile. Specifically, we
are interested in the response of the commercial bank lending rate to
a money market interest rate movement. International evidence sug-
gests that lending interest rates are somewhat sluggish to adjust to
changes in the policy rate. This stickiness is generally related to lack
of competition in the banking sector, capital flow restrictions, and
volatility of the policy rate.
One of the first comprehensive empirical studies on bank interest
rate pass-through for monetary policy is Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994).
They find important differences among countries: the estimated im-
pact effects vary between 0.06 and 0.83, and the long-run effects range
from 0.59 to 1.48, with an average of 0.97. Our estimates for the
Chilean case are an impact of 0.81 and a long-run pass-through of
0.97 for nominal interest rates.
Previous studies suggest that sluggish adjustment is associated
with market conditions and regulation of the banking sector. In this
paper, we use bank-level data to explore other factors that may influ-
ence the degree of delay in market interest rate response to changes
in the policy rate. The aim is to identify which characteristics may
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explain the differences in the average rates charged by each bank
and their responsiveness to movements in the policy rate. The main
variables considered are bank size, type of customers, and the loan
risk level, which is related to demand elasticity and the cost of ad-
justment for banks. The theoretical model presented in the paper
motivates the choice of these factors, and dynamic panel data estima-
tion supports the implications of the model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, we briefly review the
previous literature and present our own estimations for the Chilean
case, at an aggregate level. Section 2 discusses some stylized facts for
the Chilean banking industry and presents a model of monopolistic
competition with asymmetric information for bank lending rates, to-
gether with the panel data econometric analysis. In section 3, we
summarize and present some concluding remarks.
1. CHILE VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
This section offers a brief review of empirical studies related to
the flexibility of the bank lending rate in different countries. We also
present our own estimations for Chile and compare them with re-
sults for other countries.
The lending rate stickiness refers to the small response of com-
mercial banks’ lending rate to a money market interest rate move-
ment. Berger and Hannan (1989), Hannan and Berger (1991), and
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) provide arguments and evidence for a
sluggish adjustment of the lending interest rate in the short run.
They find that in the long run, the lending rate fully adjusts to the
shift in the money market rate. Many subsequent papers test the
monetary policy transmission for specific countries under different
periods and types of regulation. All of them are based on different
parameterization of the following basic model:
where i represents the bank-lending rate, m is the money market or
interbank rate, and ∆MPR is the change in the monetary policy in-
terest rate. The difference between the money market or interbank
rate and the monetary policy rate is that the first two are interest
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rates determined in the market, while the latter is set by the Central
Bank as a target value. In Chile, as in many other countries, mon-
etary policy is conducted by managing liquidity, such that the inter-
bank or money market rate is in line with the policy rate. We can
therefore separate the effect of monetary policy into two steps: from
policy rate to money market rate and from money market rate to
lending rate; we are interested in the second step. The coefficient of
interest is α 0, which indicates the impact or the short-run effect of
the money market or interbank rate on the lending rate. It is ex-
pected to be positive and less than or equal to one. The coefficient
that measures the long-run effect of the money market rate on the
lending rate is estimated as
This coefficient is expected to be positive and close to one in an indus-
try that is highly competitive.
1.1 Literature Review
In the empirical literature we find two types of studies, those that
analyze monetary transmission mechanisms using cross-country data
and those that give evidence using time series data for specific coun-
tries. The first group computes impact and long-run effects for differ-
ent countries and then relates their findings with financial structures
and macroeconomic variables of the different economies included in
the sample. The second group uses country case studies to look for
changes in the monetary policy transmission over time and for varia-
tion in interest rates. The main idea of both types of studies is to
capture the effect of institutional features on the transmission of
monetary policy.
One of the first comprehensive empirical studies on interest rate
pass-through for monetary policy is Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994).
This study estimates equation (1) for thirty-one countries, including
developed and developing countries. They find important differences
across countries in the impact coefficient, but the long-run coefficient
tends to one in most cases. In a second step, they correlate the differ-
ent coefficients with possible explanatory variables. The main finding
here is that the impact coefficient is highly correlated with the struc-
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becomes more flexible when the barriers to entry to the banking in-
dustry are low, the share of private ownership in the banking system
is high, there are no constraints on international capital movement,
and there is a market for negotiable short-term instruments. Neither
market concentration nor the existence of a market for instruments
issued by firms affects the degree of interest rate stickiness.
An important policy implication obtained by Cottarelli and Kourelis
is the relevance of the discount rate or monetary policy rate as a policy
instrument. In general, they argue that the movement in the discount
rate is interpreted as a signal that helps reduce the degree of sticki-
ness, especially in those economies with a weak financial structure.
Borio and Fritz (1995) examine the relationship between the mon-
etary policy rate and the bank lending rate for a group of member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD). Canada, Great Britain, and the Netherlands show a
high short-run coefficient (above 0.7), while Germany, Italy, Japan,
and Spain exhibit the highest degree of interest rate stickiness. The
pass-through is more homogenous across countries in the long run,
and it moves closer to one. Borio and Fritz argue that the difference
in the results across countries may have to do with the type of lend-
ing rate available. In fact, interest rates for prime customers tend to
adjust faster than other interest rates.
Mojon (2000) analyzes monetary policy transmission across euro
area countries. He also looks for the implications of different finan-
cial structures for the stickiness of the retail interest rate. Like
Cottarelli and Kourelis, he finds large differences in the short-run
coefficients for different countries, ranging from 0.5 in Italy to 0.99 in
Netherlands.1 The pass-through coefficient is lower the higher is the
volatility of the money market rate and the lower is the competition
from other sources of finance (the level of banking disintermediation).
Competition among banks reduces asymmetries through the inter-
est rate cycle; that is, the size of the pass-through coefficient is less
affected for upward movement in the interest rate than for down-
ward movement.
A second group of studies concentrates their analysis on specific
country cases. Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli,
Ferri, and Generale (1995) explore why the transmission of the mon-
etary policy rate is so slow in Italy. They find that the high degree of
1. Toolsema, Sturm, and de Haan (2001) find similar results for the same
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stickiness is explained by the constraints to competition in the bank-
ing and financial system. Banks that operate in more competitive
markets tend to translate movements of the money market rate into
lending interest rates faster than do banks operating in a less com-
petitive environment. This conclusion is based not only on the inter-
national comparison of Italian banking industry with the rest of the
countries, but also on data analysis at the individual bank level. The
stickiness of lending rates tends to decline with financial liberaliza-
tion in Italy, which is consistent with the results using microeconomic
data for different banks and regions of that country.
Using the same methodology as earlier studies, Moazzami (1999)
confirms that interest rate stickiness in the United States was higher
than in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s. The degree of flexibility
has changed for both countries, however, moving in opposite direc-
tions over the first half of the 1990s. The short-run pass-through has
thus converged to around 0.40 for both Canada and United States.
The author attributes these changes to a more competitive environ-
ment for the U.S. banking system and a less competitive one for
Canada.
Winker (1999) combines an adverse selection model with a mar-
ginal-cost pricing model to find an empirical equation in which the
lending and deposit rates depend on the money market rate in the
long run but not in the short run owing to the adverse selection prob-
lem. Based on the same argument, he justifies the lending rate’s
lower speed of adjustment toward its long-run level compared with
the deposit rate, since the short-run coefficient for the lending rate is
much smaller than that of the deposit interest rate. Winker provides
evidence for his model for the case of Germany.
For the case of Spain, Manzano and Galmés (1996) use an inter-
esting database that allows them analyze the speed of interest rate
adjustment by type of bank. They define four groups of financial in-
stitutions: national banks specialized in commercial banking, savings
banks, foreign banks, and merchant banks. The degree of short-run
interest rate response to changes in the interbank rate varies greatly
across groups, from 0.25 to 0.75 in the short-term impact coefficient.
In the long run, all but saving banks have a total impact coefficient
greater than one based on the reported confidence interval. In the
case of savings banks, the coefficient is strictly less than one, although
the deposit rate shows a higher degree of stickiness in both the short
run and the long run. The impact coefficient ranges from 0.2 to 0.46,
and the total impact varies between 0.63 and 0.81.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the literature reviewed.188 Solange Berstein and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
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Winker, P. (1999)
Germany
Manzano and Galmés (1996)
Spain
Table 1. Summary of Results of Reviewed Literature
Short term: 0.06 to 0.83
Long term: 0.59 to 1.48,
with an average equal to 0.97
Response to a simultaneous
change in policy and money
market rate
Short term: 0.0 to 1.08
Long term: 0.74 to 1.17
Short term: 0.5 (Italy)
to 0.99 (Netherlands)




Short term (CAN): 0.46 to 1.1
Short term (USA): 0.25 to 0.6
Long term (CAN): 0.6 to 2.0
Long term (USA): 0.8 to 1.2
Short term: 0.1 (lending rate)
and 0.42 (deposit rate)
Long term coefficient tends to 1
Short term: 0.25–0.75 (lending
rate) and 0.2–0.5 (deposit rate)
Long term: 0.66–1.2 (lending) and
0.63–0.81 (deposit)
The degree of flexibility increases
with the elimination of capital
flow restrictions, lower barriers
to competition, private property
in the banking industry, and the
existence of short-run
instruments
The type of lending interest rate
used could explain the
differences across countries.
For some countries the lending
rate is applied to the best larger
customer while for others the
rates correspond to retail
banking.
The flexibility of interest rate
increases with lower volatility
of the monetary policy interest
rate, and higher external and
within-industry competition
The degree of stickiness is
inversely related to the degree
of competition and financial
liberalization
The impact coefficient has
increased over time in the
United States and decreased in
Canada. The reason could have
to do with changes in financial
system structure in those
countries.
The speed of adjustment to changes
in the money market rate is
lower in lending rates than in
deposit rate
The lending rate tends to response
faster in the short and the long
run. The type of customer
affects the degree of response.Is There Lending Rate Stickiness in the Chilean Banking Industry? 189
1.2 Chile Compared with Other Countries
This section presents the results at the aggregate level for the
Chilean banking industry. The lending rate at the aggregate level
was constructed using a weighted average of interest rate for indi-
vidual banks; the weights were the total amount of loans in the cor-
responding category. Figure 1 plots the lending interest rate and the
interbank rate for the period under analysis. The lending rates follow
the interbank interest rate very closely.
An important feature to take into account is that Chilean banks
conduct transactions in pesos and in unidades de fomento (UF), which
is a unit of account indexed to past inflation.2 This unit of account is
used for medium- and long-term transactions. We therefore estimated
equation (1) for peso-denominated loans and UF-denominated loans.
The most common maturity for the former is less than thirty days
(approximately 50 percent of total nominal loans). For the latter, the
typical maturity is 90 to 360 days, but it is mainly concentrated around
90 days (approximately 40 percent of total UF-indexed loans). Figure
2 presents the evolution of the lending interest rate for loans of longer
maturity and the interest rate on ninety-day Central Bank indexed
promissory notes (PRBC). Again, the two interest rates move closely
together.3
Figure 1. Lending Interest Rate and Interbank Rate
Source: Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) and Central Bank of Chile.
2. See Schiller (2002) for a discussion of the use of indexed unit accounts
around the world and the UF.
3. Monetary policy is handled through the interbank interest rate, although
the ninety-day PRBC interest rate is a good measure of the monetary policy rate
for ninety days.190 Solange Berstein and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
Next, we estimated a model represented by equation (1). The num-
ber of lags chosen was sufficiently high such that the error term be-
comes white noise. Several papers estimate this equation using
different parameterization. The most popular is the error correction
model, based on the idea that interest rates are not stationary. There
are good economic arguments for disregarding that possibility for in-
terest rates.4 Nevertheless, to be skeptical, we ran different tests for
unit roots, which are presented in the appendix. All the tests reject
the presence of unit roots, so we proceeded to run the model in levels.
Table 2 presents the results for the interest rate applied to peso-
denominated loans. Columns 1 and 3 show the results of equation (1)
controlling for inflation; columns 2 and 4 take into account the dra-
matic increase in the interest rates during 1998, using a dummy vari-
able, D98, that takes the value one for January 1998 to October 1998.
Although the dummy variable is statistically significant, the overall
conclusions do not change much. The impact coefficient fluctuates
between 0.7 to 0.8, while in all cases the hypothesis of the long-run
coefficient being equal to one cannot be rejected. Therefore, on aver-
age, banks fully adjust the lending rate to a change in the interbank
interest rate in the long run.
Table 3 shows the results for the indexed lending rate. Again, we
controlled for the 1998 interest rate turmoil, but it was not statisti-
cally significant except for July 1998. The inflation rate was not in-
cluded, since the variables are indexed interest rates. The impact
coefficient is around 0.85, while the long-term coefficient is statisti-
cally equal to 1.
Figure 2. Lending Interest Rate and Ninety-day PRBC
Source: SBIF and Central Bank of Chile.
4. See Chumacero (2001) for a discussion of unit roots based on economics.Is There Lending Rate Stickiness in the Chilean Banking Industry? 191
How do these results compare with the international evidence?
Table 4 exhibits the comparison between the coefficient reported in
column 2 of tables 2 and 3. The estimates for Chile show a high flex-
ibility of the banking interest rate. In fact, the estimation positions
Chile close to Mexico and the United Kingdom. According to Cottarelli
30-day 30-day 30- to 89-day 30- to 89-day
Variable lending rate lending rate lending rate lending rate
Interbank rate
Interbank rate (t – 1)
Interbank rate (t – 2)
Interbank rate (t – 3)
Interbank rate (t – 4)
Interbank rate (t – 6)
D(MPR)
Lending rate (t – 1)
Lending rate (t – 2)
Inflation (t – 2)
D98
D98* Interbank rate
D98* Interbank rate (t – 1)
D98*D(MPR)
Constant
Long-run coefficient (λ )
Wald test (λ  = 1)
Summary statistic
R2
Table 2. Interest Rate Transmission: Nominal Lending Ratea
a. t statistics are in parentheses.
* Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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and Kourelis, the variables that tend to increase the interest rate
pass-through are the degree of competition and financial liberaliza-
tion. It is important to take into account that the time periods are
different for the countries included in Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)
with respect to the present study. The former uses data for the 1980s,
while we use data for the 1990s. Relevant conditions for interest rate
sluggishness were different in the 1990s than in previous decades.
2. EVIDENCE FOR CHILE AT THE BANK LEVEL
The previous section exposed some evidence in favor of interest
rates stickiness. This is the case for almost all the countries that
have been studied to date, and it is also the case of Chile, to some
90- to 360-day 90- to 360-day
Variable lending rate lending rate
PRBC
PRBC (t – 1)
PRBC (t – 2)
PRBC (t – 4)
PRBC (t – 5)
Lending rate (t – 1)
Lending rate (t – 5)
D98 (July)
Constant
Long-run coefficient (λ )
Wald test (λ  = 1)
Summary statistic
R2
Table 3. Interest Rate Transmission: Indexed Lending Rate
a. t statistics are in parentheses.
* Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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extent.5 We further argued that previous studies suggest that slug-
gish adjustment is related to market conditions and regulation of the
banking sector. In this section, we use bank-level data to explore the
factors that may influence the degree of delay in market interest rate
response to changes in the policy rate.
For this purpose, we analyze the differences in the interest rate
levels charged by banks and the adjustment to changes in the policy
rate. In the Chilean case, we observe an important divergence be-
tween the interest rates charged by banks, as well as significant dif-
ferences within a bank depending on the kind of loan, the type of
customer, firm or household, and the amount of the loan. Legislation
imposes a ceiling on the interest rate charged by loan category, which
somewhat limits this dispersion (50 percent above the average mar-
ket interest rate by loan category).6
Our aim is to identify which characteristics might explain the
differences in the average rates charged by each bank and their re-
sponsiveness to movements in the policy rate. The main characteris-
tics considered were the size of the bank, the type of customer, and
the loan risk level. Other variables, such as solvency or liquidity,
were also considered, but they did not prove to be significant for ex-
plaining differences in lending rates, so the results are not presented.
5. As shown in section 1, the impact effect of changes in the policy rate were
less than one for most of the countries studied, including Chile.
6. SBIF (2000).















Table 4. International Comparison of Interest Rate Stickiness
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from SBIF.
a. Average for the 1996–2002 period. Large banks are those that have a market share over total loans of more than
5 percent.
b. Type of customer is measured as household loans as a percentage of total loans.
c. Loan risk is measured as past-due loans as a percentage of total loans
The data used is at the bank level. We do not have enough informa-
tion at this point on different transactions within a bank, but this
area represents an important future extension of the study.
2.1 Stylized Facts for the Chilean Banking Industry
Tables 5 and 6 show that larger banks charged, on average, lower
interest rates than smaller banks during the sample period. For
smaller banks, the nominal monthly rate was 1.21, whereas for larger
banks this rate was 1.16 for the period 1996–2002. In the case of the
UF rate, smaller banks showed a yearly rate of 8.55 percent, on aver-
age—that is, 3.5 percent higher than the average for larger banks
(8.26 percent). This evidence might support two alternative hypoth-
eses: namely, the structure-performance hypothesis or the efficiency-
structure hypothesis. Under the first hypothesis, differences in prices
would respond solely to imperfect competition, with differences in
price elasticities across markets served by different banks. The sec-
ond would imply that there are cost advantages for larger banks,
together with some degree of market imperfection that allows ineffi-
cient banks to survive, at least in the short run.
Loan Riskc
Type of customerb indicator < 2 percent > 2 percent Total












Table 5. Large Banks: Thirty-day Nominal Rate and
Correlation with the Interbank Rate, by Loan Risk
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In terms of loan risk, banks with a higher percentage of past-due
loans (more than 2 percent) charged, on average, higher interest rates
to their clients, as expected. This is 11.1 percent higher in the case of
nominal rates and 8.6 percent in the case of UF rates, over the sample
period. When we compute a simple correlation between lending rates
and our indicator for the policy rate (the interbank rate in the case of
nominal interest rates and the ninety-day PRBC in the case of UF
interest rates), this correlation is smaller for banks with lower-qual-
ity loans. This may be due to adverse selection problems, in the sense
that if interest rates increase, only riskier projects (with a higher
expected return) would stay in the market and the average quality of
the loan portfolio would decrease, thereby lowering the bank’s prof-
its. Banks will thus not respond rapidly to an increase in the policy
rate, especially in the case of banks with a higher portion of past-due
loans. On the other hand, if the policy rate decreases, we would ex-
pect less responsiveness from banks with a riskier portfolio, because
it is more difficult for riskier clients to move to other banks. Banks
with a larger portion of past due loans thus have less incentive to
decrease interest rates, at least in the short run.
Table 6. Small Banks: Thirty-day Nominal Rate and
Correlation with the Interbank Rate, by Loan Risk and Type
of Customera
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from SBIF.
a. Average for the 1996–2002 period. Small banks are those that have a market share over total loans of less than
5 percent.
b. Type of customer is measured as household loans as a percentage of total loans.
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Finally, in tables 7 and 8 we analyze differences in interest rates
charged by banks classified by type of loan.7 We are able to make this
distinction only for smaller banks because larger banks do not dis-
play much difference within this category, since all of them have more
than 10 percent of household loans. So, for smaller banks we have
two groups: those with less than 10 percent of the loans given to
households and those with more than 10 percent.
In the case of both nominal interest rates and UF interest rates
for smaller banks, the higher average rate charged corresponds to
banks that have a larger portion of past-due loans and a lower share
of household loans, while banks with low risk and a low share of
household loans charge lower interest rates. This indicates that there
is an important dispersion of interest rates charged to firms, which
seems to be larger than in the case of households. This evidence
suggests that the demand elasticity of households is larger than that
of firms. A possible explanation for this is that asymmetric informa-
tion leads firms to establish a long-term relationship with their banks
to a greater extent than households; this gives additional market
power to the banks, owing to higher switching costs for firms.
7. The type of loan is measured as the percentage of total loans made to
households (consumption plus mortgage).
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from SBIF.
a. Average for the 1996–2002 period. Large banks are those that have a market share over total loans of more than
5 percent.
b. Type of customer is measured as household loans as a percentage of total loans.
c. Loan risk is measured as past-due loans as a percentage of total loans
Loan Riskc
Type of customerb indicator < 2 percent > 2 percent Total












Table 7. Large Banks: Ninety-day to One-year Indexed Rate
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2.2 A Model for Lending Rate Stickiness
This section presents a model that we use to build on some of the
hypotheses that we test for the Chilean banking industry. These hy-
potheses are related to the stylized facts presented in the previous
section. The model gives us some insights about what to expect
from our empirical analysis, as well as possible explanations for our
findings.
It seems appropriate to assume an imperfect competition model
in the case of the banking sector, where there are significant barri-
ers to entry and an important degree of product differentiation.8 We
also assume that there is asymmetric information in this industry,
which leads to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. We com-
bine these two issues by assuming that banks make a two-step deci-
sion, which considers the long-run equilibrium and the short-run
behavior that will take them to this condition.9
For the long run, we assume a simple Monte-Klein model for a
monopolistic bank that faces a downward sloping demand for loans
Loan Riskc
Type of customerb indicator < 2 percent > 2 percent Total












Table 8. Small Banks: Ninety-day to One-year Indexed Rate
and Correlation with the PRBC Rate, by Loan Risk and Type
of Customera
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from SBIF.
a. Average for the 1996–2002 period. Small banks are those that have a market share over total loans of less than
5 percent.
b. Type of customer is measured as household loans as a percentage of total loans.




























8. Freixas and Rochet (1998).
9. This method of combining these two factors is similar to Scholnick (1991),
Winker (1999), and Bondt (2002).198 Solange Berstein and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
L(iL) and an upward sloping supply of deposits D(iD). This captures
the fact that banks have some monopoly power. The decision vari-
ables for the firm are the quantities of loans (L) and deposits (D).
Bank k maximizes the following profit function:
where γ k is the probability that the loan will be repaid, m is the inter-
bank rate (which is given for individual banks), α  is the proportion of
deposits that constitutes cash reserves, iD is the deposit interest rate,
and iL is the lending interest rate. C(D,L) accounts for the total cost
of intermediation services, which is a function of the total amount of
deposits and loans.
Solving for the first-order conditions and rearranging terms, we
get to the following expressions for the lending interest rate:
where ε k is the absolute value of the demand elasticity for loans,
which is greater than 1 since we are assuming monopolistic competi-
tion. For the purpose of this paper, we are interested in the loan
market and we assume that costs are separable, so that the optimal
lending rate is independent of the characteristics of the deposit mar-
ket. This simple model leads us to conclude that different interest
rates charged on loans may reflect different demand elasticities and
the probability of loan repayment (portfolio risk).
The above model is interpreted as the long-run equilibrium for
banks. To simplify our model, we assume each bank faces a constant
elasticity demand function. In other words, ε  might be different for
each bank, but it is independent of iL. We can write this relationship
between the lending rate and the interbank rate as iL* = Φ km. (Here,
Φ k = ε k / (ε k – 1)γ k is a mark up, which is a function of demand elastic-
ity and the repayment probability). Thus, the long-run pass-through
coefficient is larger the smaller is the demand elasticity and the smaller
is the probability of repayment. This long-run coefficient may or may
not be equal to 1, when there is some degree of monopoly power.
Asymmetric information, however, results in a sluggish adjust-
ment process to get to this long-run equilibrium. In fact, we are in-
terested in finding out whether there is some delay in the response of
market interest rates to changes in the policy rate and whether this
, (3) () ( ) [] () ( ) [] () k k k k D k k L k k L D C D D i m L m L i D L , 1 , , , − − α − + − γ = π
, (4) () () L
k k
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delay depends on bank characteristics related to demand elasticity
and asymmetric information.
Specifically, we are thinking of a setup in which in the short run,
banks solve an intertemporal problem characterized by a cost of ad-
justing too slowly to this long-run equilibrium and a cost of moving
too fast. This latter cost is due to adverse selection and moral hazard
problems in the banking industry. For instance, if a bank increases
the lending rate in response to an increase in the money market
rate, the bank’s adjustment to its new long-term equilibrium may
involve attracting debtors that have a lower repayment probability,
thereby lowering the bank’s profits. At the same time, moral hazard
arises because a higher interest rate gives debtors incentives to in-
vest in riskier projects, which would also decrease the bank’s prof-
its.10 Under this framework, therefore, we assume that there are
some adjustment costs stemming from asymmetric information. This
is modeled as a quadratic loss function following Nickell (1985),
Scholnick (1991), and Winker (1999), which is tractable because it
generates a linear decision rule.11 The loss function for bank k in
period t is the following:
where ω 1 and ω 2 represent the weight that the bank gives to achieving
the long-run target value for the lending rate and the cost of moving to
that target value, respectively. Recall that Φ k is a function of the de-
mand elasticity and the probability of repayment that bank k faces,
whereas ω j, j = 1,2, depends on the bank’s average loan risk. If the
portion of past-due loans for bank k is higher, the adverse selection or
moral hazard problem for that bank becomes more important and the
bank will give more weight to changes in the interest rate, which im-
plies a slower adjustment. On minimizing equation (5), we obtain
10. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
11. Scholnick (1991) and Winker (1999) also include a third term in the loss
function, but it is not included in our setup. For an argument, see Nickell (1985).
The other difference is that we have a multiplicative mark-up instead of an addi-
tive mark-up.
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Equation (6) shows that the impact coefficient depends on the
size of ω 1,k relative to ω 1,k + ω 2,k and the mark up, Φ k. Therefore, the
long-run coefficient is always larger than the short-term coefficient.
The bank’s loan risk determines Φ k and ω 2,k: the lower the probabil-
ity of repayment (higher risk), the higher are both Φ k and ω 2,k. If the
debtors are too risky and the effect on ω 2,k is more important, the
bank may not completely pass through a money market interest rate
increase (in the short run) because it would stifle the debtors. In the
long run, however, the interest rate charged will reflect the risk char-
acteristic of the debtor. In other words, unpaid loans should have a
negative effect on the impact coefficient and a positive effect on the
long-term multiplier.
The main difference between our setup and the one presented by
Scholnick (1991) and Winker (1999) is that they derive an error cor-
rection model (ECM) from this quadratic loss function. Our variables
are stationary, however, even if we assume that there is a long-run
relationship between the interbank rate and the lending rate. We
therefore estimate our econometric model in levels and not in an
ECM form. Recall that the ECM has this interpretation only if the
variables are nonstationary and cointegrated, which is not the case
for our data.12
The other important difference is that we use the above model in
a panel data estimation (in section 2.3) that allows the parameters to
be different for different banks depending on their characteristics.
2.3 Econometric Results
The model described above suggests that differences in interest
rate pass-through might be related to product characteristics such as
the type of customer or the risk level of the loan portfolio. The econo-
metric analysis presented in this section allows us to address this
issue by estimating a dynamic panel data model in which bank char-
acteristics are interacted with the interbank rate and its lags. An
alternative method is time series estimation by bank, but it has the
drawback that changes in bank characteristics during this time may
be affecting the sluggishness of adjustment for each bank, which is
not correctly captured.13
12. Unit root tests is presented in the appendix. Derivation of the ECM and
explanation of why it is not appropriate with stationary data are found in Nickell
(1985) and Wickens and Breush (1988).
13. See Berstein and Fuentes (2003) for time series estimations at the bank level.Is There Lending Rate Stickiness in the Chilean Banking Industry? 201
We estimate the following equation, which is based on the model
described in section 2.2. Adverse selection is captured by the adjust-
ment cost coefficient of the model, which is a function of the quality
of loan portfolio, and we allow demand elasticity to be a function of
the type of customers the bank has and the size of the bank.
where M is a vector that contains the lagged lending rate and the
money market rate, and X’ is a vector of bank characteristics, which
includes: the loan portfolio risk, measured as the portion of past-due
loans; type of consumers, measured as the share of household loans
(consumption and mortgage); and bank size, measured as the per-
centage of total loans. Finally, ηh is a bank-specific effect.
The problem of estimating dynamic panel data has been widely
discussed in the literature, and different methods have been proposed
to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters. Anderson and Hsiao
(1982) propose a method based on instrumental variables (IV), which
consists in taking first differences of the equation to eliminate unob-
served heterogeneity and then using instrumental variables to esti-
mate consistently the parameters of the lag-dependent variables.
For instance, the following equation is to be estimated using panel
data:
where yit represents the lending interest rate, xit represents a depen-
dent variable like the interbank interest rate, and ηi is the unob-
served heterogeneity. After taking the first difference, the equation
to be estimated is
Anderson and Hsiao propose yi,t–2 or (yi,t–2 – yi,t–3) as an instrument for
(yi,t–1 – yi,t–2), but Arellano (1989) shows that yi,t–2 is a much better
instrument for a significant range of values of the true  in equation (9).
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose an alternative methodology
based on generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. This
, (8) it i it it it u x y y + η + β + ρ = − 1
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method uses several lags of the variables included as instruments, so
it is especially efficient when T is small and N is large.14 The method
is applied to equation (6), using moment restrictions that come from
the use of instrumental variables. Judson and Owen (1999) provide
evidence that for small T, GMM is a better estimator than Anderson
and Hsiao’s methods under the mean square error criterion. It is
unclear, however, which method is better for unbalanced panel data
and T around 20.
Several other methods have been developed based on the tradi-
tional within-group, IV, and GMM estimators. The IV method tends
to work better than the within-group estimator when N tends to in-
finity (N is very large) and T is fixed. Alvarez and Arellano (2002)
show the asymptotic property of the within-group, GMM, and limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimators. An important
result for our case is that regardless the asymptotic behavior of N,
the estimator of ρ is consistent when T goes to infinity. Moreover, if
lim(N / T) = 0 (as T goes to infinity) there is no asymptotic bias in the
asymptotic distribution of the within-group estimator, while in the
opposite case of lim(T / N) = 0 (as N goes to infinity), there is no
asymptotic bias in the asymptotic distribution of the GMM estimator.
In our panel, T is large and increasing over time, while N remains
relatively fixed. The traditional within-group estimator will thus pro-
vide the best results.15
Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the thirty-day nominal inter-
est rate and for the 90- to 360-day indexed interest rates, respec-
tively. The first column of tables 9 and 10 present the results of the
panel estimation without controlling for the 1998 effect and without
considering the interaction between bank characteristics and the right-
hand-side variables. If we compare these regressions with the ones
from section 1, we observe that the impact and long-run effects (shown
at the bottom of each table) are smaller than what we found previ-
ously. Note that previously, we were estimating impact and long-run
effects at an aggregate level using the weighted average interest rates,
so that large banks drive the results to a larger extent on those re-
gressions than on the panel data estimation.
14. See Judson and Owen (1999) for further discussion of the advantages of
different methodologies.
15. See Berstein and Fuentes (2003) for panel data estimations using Ander-
son and Hsiao, and Arellano and Bond methods.Is There Lending Rate Stickiness in the Chilean Banking Industry? 203
The second column of tables 9 and 10 present the results of the
panel estimation controlling for the 1998 effect. The impact and the
long-run coefficients decrease relative to those reported in the first
column of each table, but the values are consistent with the idea that
the long-term coefficient is larger than the short-term coefficient.
However the long-term coefficient is not statistically equal to 1. The





Nominal rate, 30 days (–1)
Nominal rate, 30 days (–3)




Interbank * risk (–1)
Interbank (–1) * risk (–2)








Table 9. Panel with Interaction and 1998 Dummies,
Thirty-day Nominal Rate
a. The dependent variable is the thirty-day nominal interest rate. Models (2) and (3) control for the year 1998.
The models were estimated using fixed effects, which are not reported; t statistics in parentheses.
* Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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Table 10. Panel with Interaction and 1998 Dummies,
Ninety-day to One-year Indexed Ratea







UF rate, 90 days to 1 year (–1)
UF rate, 90 days to 1 year (–3)
UF rate, 90 days to 1 year (–4)
UF rate, 90 days to 1 year (–5)
UF rate, 90 days to 1 year (–6)
D [MPR (–1)]
PRBC (–2) * risk (–3)
UF rate, 90 days to 1 year (–1) *
risk (–2)
PRBC * market share






a. The dependent variable is the thirty-day nominal interest rate. Models (2) and (3) control for the year 1998.
The models were estimated using fixed effects, which are not reported; t statistics in parentheses.
* Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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last column in each table allows us to check the hypotheses provided
by the theoretical model. In the case of nominal interest rates, the
riskier the portfolio, the lower is the impact coefficient, which is con-
sistent with the idea that banks will not pass interest rate change on
to debtors in the short run, according to the difference equation (6).
In the long run, however, the pass-through will be larger the riskier
is the portfolio. This relationship is represented in figures 3 and 4,
which illustrate how the average loan risk has increased over time
and the estimated impact effect has decreased while the long run
effect gets larger.
In the case of the indexed interest rate, the results are different.
The impact coefficient is not affected by the portfolio risk, while the
level of the unpaid loans affects the long-run coefficient by reducing
it (see figure 5).
Figure 4. Long-run Effect and Loan Risk, Thirty-day
Nominal Rate
Figure 3. Impact Effect and Loan Risk, Thirty-day
Nominal Rate206 Solange Berstein and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
Finally, for both nominal and indexed rate, bank size negatively
affects the pass-through, while banks that are more oriented toward
households have a larger pass-through.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The estimates presented in this paper support the fact that the
banking interest rate in Chile is highly flexible. In fact, the estima-
tion positions Chile close to Mexico and the United Kingdom, coun-
tries displaying the highest degree of flexibility.
An earlier study by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) identifies the
degree of competition and financial liberalization as the main deter-
minants of interest rate stickiness. We used bank-level data to ex-
plore other factors that influence the degree of delay in market interest
rate response to changes in the policy rate. The main characteristics
identified in our analysis of differences in the interest rate levels
charged by banks and their adjustment to changes in the policy rate
are bank size, type of customers, and the loan risk level.
Our bank-level econometric analysis found significant differences
in banks’ responses to changes in the policy interest rate. Moreover,
the smaller the bank, the lower the portion of past-due loans, and the
larger the share of household consumers—the faster is the response
of lending interest rates to movements in the money market rate.
These results are consistent with the model and the stylized facts
presented in the paper.
Topics for future research include alternative measures for cap-
turing loan risk and other characteristics that would help improve
Figure 5. Long-run Effect and Loan Risk, Ninety-day to
One-year UF RateIs There Lending Rate Stickiness in the Chilean Banking Industry? 207
measures of different demand elasticities, at the bank level. Further-
more, the availability of disaggregated information on the interest
rates charged for different types of loans within a bank would im-
prove estimates of the effects of loan risk or type of customer on the
interest rate responses to changes in policy rates.208 Solange Berstein and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
APPENDIX
Unit Root Tests
We ran different tests for unit roots, all of which reject the pres-
ence of unit roots. The results are presented in table A1. The tests
consider a trend for the nominal interest rates, and we used the modi-
fied Akaike information criterion to choose the number of lags. We
use augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron tests with
the modified Akaike to solve the size problem of the tests, but the
power is very low. The power of the tests is higher when using Dickey-
Fuller generalized least squares (DF-GLS) and Phillips-Perron-Ng.
Phillips- Phillips-
Rate ADF DF-GLS Perron Perron Ng Mzt
PRBC
Interbank rate
UF, 90 days to 1 year
Nominal rate, 30 days
Table A1. Unit Root Tests, 1995 to 2001
* Nonstationarity rejected at 5 percent.
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